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Abstract 
We examine nine changes in the New York State Security Transaction Taxes (STT) 
between 1932 and 1981. We find that imposing or increasing an STT results in wider bid-
ask spreads, lower volume, and increased price impact of trades. In contrast to theories of 
STT imposition as a means to reduce volatility, we find no consistent relationship 
between the level of an STT and volatility. We examine the propensity of traders to 
switch trading locations to avoid the tax and find no consistent evidence that they will 
change locations. We do find evidence to suggest that taxes imposed on the par value of 
stock will result in corporations managing the par value in the direction of minimizing the 
impact of the tax on investors. 
JEL classification: G10, G12, C43 
Bank classification: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing; Econometric and 
statistical methods  
Résumé 
Les auteurs examinent les neuf changements que l’État de New York a apportés à sa taxe 
sur les transactions de titres entre 1932 et 1981. Ils constatent que l’instauration d’une 
taxe de ce genre ou sa majoration conduit à un élargissement des écarts entre les cours 
acheteur et vendeur, à une baisse des volumes ainsi qu’à une augmentation de l’incidence 
des transactions sur les prix. À l’inverse de ce que prédisent les théories prônant 
l’imposition d’une taxe sur les transactions afin de réduire la volatilité des marchés 
financiers, ils n’observent aucun lien systématique entre le niveau de la taxe et celui de la 
volatilité. Ils se penchent aussi sur la tendance qu’auraient les arbitragistes à se relocaliser 
pour soustraire leurs transactions à la taxe. Les données ne corroborent pas cette 
hypothèse. Les auteurs relèvent cependant des indices montrant que l’imposition d’une 
taxe sur la valeur nominale d’une action incite la société émettrice à gérer cette valeur de 
manière à minimiser l’effet de la taxe sur les investisseurs. 
Classification JEL : G10, G12, C43 
Classification de la Banque : Marchés financiers; Structure de marché et fixation des 





Securities transaction taxes (STTs) have received renewed interest as a result of the 
recent economic turmoil. At the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, the G-20 leaders tasked 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to explore a “range of options countries have adopted or 
are considering as to how the financial sector could make a fair and substantial contribution 
toward paying for any burdens associated with government interventions to repair the banking 
system” and report back for the June 2010 Toronto meeting. An STT was one potential 
instrument considered for raising revenue from the sector’s activities and has gained support 
from several G-20 countries, such as France and Germany.
1 
For decades advocates of STTs have argued that the tax can be used to raise significant 
tax revenue while discouraging destabilizing speculative trading and limiting excess volatility by 
‘throw[ing] sand in the wheels’ of financial markets. Opponents of STTs, in contrast, argue that 
an STT will harm market quality by reducing volume, increasing price volatility and causing 
inefficient price discovery.  They contend that an STT can lead to lower asset prices, an 
increased cost of capital for businesses, lower returns to savings and widespread tax evasion. 
This debate is frequently revisited, yet no consensus on the impact of STTs has been reached. 
The issue though has immediate policy implications, and is of great interest to policymakers, 
academics and politicians.  
Empirical studies examining the implications of an STT either use a quasi-tax
2, test 
smaller markets which do not provide a variety of firm sizes, or look at international market 
competition where a lack of fungibility inhibits the transfer of volume from one exchange to 
another. Further, there is no existing empirical study of the impact of a U.S. imposed STT on 
                                                            
1 “Germany, France Press EU on Transaction Tax” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2011. 
2 A quasi-tax is a fixed financial payment required to trade (e.g. fixed commissions).  2 
 
market quality.
3 Nor is there an empirical study that examines the direct impact of a security 
transaction tax on equity spreads. This paper strives to fill that void by examining nine changes 
in the level of an STT imposed by New York State from 1905 to 1981. This is the first paper to 
comprehensively examine the impact of a U.S. imposed STT on various measures of market 
quality. In addition, unlike previous studies that observe the transfer of volume across country 
borders, our dataset offers the opportunity to test the hypothesis that an STT in New York State 
shifts volume from the NYSE to U.S. regional exchanges.   
While proponents of STTs argue that the imposition or increase in the tax will reduce 
speculative trading and thus volatility, we find no significant relationship between an STT and 
volatility. Being the first paper to empirically examine the impact an STT has on spreads, we find 
that an increase in the level of the STT is accompanied by an increase in spreads.  Consistent 
with previous literature we find that volume moves in the opposite direction of the tax change. 
Finally, we find a direct relationship between STTs and price impact. Taken together we find 
that an STT harms market quality.  
In the following section, we review the regulatory history of U.S. STTs at both the state 
and federal level. We then review existing theoretical and empirical work in section III. Section 
IV describes our data and presents our methodology, Section V contains results and is followed 
by our conclusions in section VI.  
 
II. Regulatory  History 
The first New York State transfer tax was imposed on June 1, 1905 at the rate of two 
cents per $100 of par value on stocks traded, transferred, or delivered in New York State.
4  The 
tax was not implemented as a financial stability measure, but a revenue generator and was 
                                                            
3 Amihud and Mendelson (1992) argue that a STT of 0.5 percent will increase transaction costs. 
Employing a model of asset pricing with transaction costs they project that a 0.5 percent STT will increase 
the average firm cost of capital by 1.3 percent and reduce the average NYSE stock price by 13.8 percent.  
4 Traded refers to the location of the exchange or contra broker. Transferred refers to the location of the 
transfer agent. Delivered refers to the domicile of the stock's seller. 3 
 
estimated to produce annual revenues of $5,000,000 to make up for the state deficit.
5 The 
original law contained a graduated tax schedule for stocks with par values below $100. In 1906, 
the New York legislature passed an amendment to the law which eliminated the graduated 
schedule for stocks with par values less than $100. In January of 1907 that amendment was 
declared unconstitutional and the graduated schedule was reinstated. Seven years later in 
response to some companies issuing stock with no par value, the law was amended to place a 
two cent tax on shares issued without par value.
6 Suffering under the weight of the Great 
Depression, New York doubled the STT on March 1, 1932 to four cents per $100 of par value 
and four cents per share for stocks without a par value to meet large state deficits. The 
graduated feature of the tax was effectively maintained for stocks with par values less than $100 
per share. For example, a stock with a par value of $10 paid an STT of $0.004 per share. 
In an effort to avoid the now doubled STT, firms began reducing their par values. By 
March of 1933 200 listed firms had reduced their par values to between $1 and $10 thereby 
greatly reducing the impact of the tax.
7 In response to this trend, New York's governor proposed 
that the tax be changed to a price basis rather than par value.
8 Effective June 2, 1933 the tax 
became $0.03 per share for stocks trading below $20 a share and $0.04 per share for stocks 
trading at or above $20. 
In 1945 the schedule was modified for shares selling for less than $20. In particular, for 
shares selling for less than $5, a tax of $0.01 per share was charged; for shares selling between 
$5-10 a tax of $0.02 per share was charged; for shares selling between $10-20 a tax of $0.03 
per share was charged; and for shares selling for over $20 a tax of $0.04 was charged.
9  This 
tax schedule remained in effect for 21 years, when on July 1, 1966 the STT was increased by 
25%.   
                                                            
5 “The Stock Transfer Tax”, New York Times, 14 March 1905. 
6 "Stock Transfer Tax Amendment," Wall Street Journal, Jun 4, 1913, p. 7. 
7 "Brokers Assail Stock Tax Plan," New York Times, Mar 26, 1933, p. N8. 
8 Ibid 
9 “Transfer Tax Bill Signed”, New York Times, 20 April 1945.  4 
 
Following the 1966 STT increase, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) began 
lobbying New York State to reduce the tax stating that it put them at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to out-of-state exchanges.   As it had done in the past the NYSE threatened to move out 
of New York to avoid the tax. Bowing to pressure from the NYSE, in 1968, an amendment was 
introduced that gradually reduced the tax imposed on non-residents until it reached a reduction 
of 50% by July 1, 1973.
10  At the time, 12% of US investors were subject to the tax as New York 
residents.
 11 The amendment also capped the maximum tax liability per trade for residents and 
non-residents placing orders within New York to $350.
12  
In August 1975, a 25% surcharge was imposed on all stock transactions, which would 
expire on July 31, 1978. Prior to its expiration, in a lawsuit filed by the Boston Stock Exchange, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found the 1968 amendments to be unconstitutional because they 
violated the interstate commerce clause by discriminating against interstate sales.
13  New York 
taxed sales made on non-New York exchanges more heavily than those sales made on New 
York exchanges.  As a result, following the 25% surcharge expiration on July 31, 1978, a four 
year phase-out period began. During this period, rebates were issued to residents, non-
residents and orders placed through the Inter-market Trading System (ITS).
14   For New York 
residents, starting October 1, 1979, 100% of the tax was paid and 30% was rebated; beginning 
October 1, 1980, 60% was rebated; and starting October 1, 1981 100% was rebated.   The 
phase-out period was slightly different for non-residents who continued to pay 50% of the tax 
through July 31, 1978 and from August 1, 1978 to September 30, 1980, paid 62.5%. This 
                                                            
10 “Stock-Transfer Tax Cut Is Signed,” New York Times, 23 June 1968, p.44. 
11 Ibid 
12 Between July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970 non-residents  paid 95%; July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971 non-
residents  paid 90%; July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972 non-residents  paid  80%; July 1, 1972 to June 30, 
1973 non-residents  paid 65% and starting on July 1, 1973 and thereafter non-residents  paid 50%. 
13 U.S Supreme Court. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) 
14 The inter-market trading system is an electronic linkage system that links together U.S. equity 
exchanges and 100% of the tax was rebated on all orders placed through ITS so that the tax would not 
hinder market competition. As a result, non-residents could avoid the tax entirely by placing orders 
through ITS. 5 
 
coincided with the expiration of the 25% surcharge and left the effective tax paid by non-
residents unchanged.  Starting October 1, 1980 non-residents were subject to the same tax 
schedule as residents. Appendix A illustrates effective transfer tax rates for various stock prices 
and partitioned by whether the investor was a New York resident or not. 
New York was not the only taxing authority to levy transfer taxes. On December 1, 1914, 
the federal government imposed a $0.02 tax on each $100 of par value of stock to help pay for 
the cost of US involvement in World War I. That tax was repealed briefly in September of 1916, 
but reinstated in December 1917.
15  On June 21, 1932 the tax was changed to $0.04 per $100 
of par value, unless the stock was trading above $20 in which case it was $0.05 per $100 of par 
value. Stocks without par values were taxed on a per share basis. On September 20, 1941, the 
tax was increased to $0.05 ($0.06) per $100 of par value for stocks trading at or below (above) 
$20 per share.  The federal tax was repealed in January 1966. 
 Massachusetts and Pennsylvania also levied transfer taxes at one time, but their impact 
was much smaller than the New York tax. By 1939 Massachusetts and Pennsylvania levied a 
tax of two cents per $100 of aggregate par-value of stock sold or two cents per share in the 
case of no par-value stock.
16  The fact that New York levied the tax on a per share basis and 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania used aggregate par value resulted in a much higher tax paid 
in New York. For example, assume a trade involving 100 shares of a $10 par value stock for 
$40 a share. The New York tax is $4 ($0.04 on each share sold) while the Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts tax is $0.20, since the aggregate par-value of the 100 shares is $1,000. It can 
therefore be seen that the New York tax is 20 times greater than the tax in Massachusetts or 
Pennsylvania.
17 We could find no record of any other state imposing a transfer tax other than 
New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 
                                                            
15 “Wall St. Sees End of Stock Sales Tax”, New York Times, 4 July 1916. 
16 Recall that New York switched to taxing on a per share basis much earlier, 
17  “Stock-Deal Taxes and Their Effects”, New York Times, 10 December 1939. Both the MA and PA 
transaction taxes remained inconsequential and were repealed in the 1950s.  6 
 
Corporations could reduce the impact of the tax on their shareholders, by managing their 
par values. To investigate this possibility, we obtain par values for our sample of 236 stocks 
from the 1932 doubling of the New York tax from the Moody's Manuals for 1934.
18 We find that 
railroad industry stocks tend to have par values of $100 (20 out of 27 firms). For the 200 non-
railroad industry stocks covered by Moody's, there were only ten with par values of $100, while 
132 listed no par value and 58 had par values between $1 and $50. We also examine reported 
changes in par value around the 1932 New York doubling of their STT. We find that 28 firms 
(from our sample of 236) changed their par value between 1930 and 1933. Of these 28 we find 
that 24 changed to a par value that lowered taxes based on par.
19 Therefore we conclude that 
firms actively changed their par values to avoid STTs for their investors. Thus, STTs that are 
based on share price cannot be avoided by corporate actions and will have the largest impact 
on investors. We would then expect the New York STT to have a measurable impact on investor 
behaviour and hence market quality. 
One purpose of this study is to examine the change in market share across state lines 
around transaction tax changes. Since the federal transfer tax could not be avoided inside the 
United States and states other than New York imposed a minuscule tax, we focus on those tax 
changes occurring in New York. We are however cognisant of confounding impacts so we are 
careful to control for changes in federal tax rates around the time of New York tax changes.  
 
III. Literature  Review 
Theoretical papers have not reached a consensus on the impact of STTs on market 
quality.  Some argue that an STT will improve market quality, while others argue that it will 
                                                            
18 See Moody's Manual of Investments and Security Rating Service volumes for industrial, bank and 
financial, public utility, and railroad securities. 
19 Fifteen increased their par value from zero to a small positive number and nine reduced their par to a 
smaller number. The remaining four firms reduced their par value to zero. 7 
 
reduce it. Still others state that the effect is ambiguous. Following is a review of the different 
camps in this ongoing debate. 
The earliest proponents of STTs, Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978), argue that an STT 
will improve market quality. In particular, Keynes contends that chasing short-term returns, while 
potentially profitable to specific individuals, is a zero-sum game in terms of economic welfare. 
Since one investor’s gain is another's loss and trading utilizes resources, the value-added 
through trading is negative. As a result, imposing an STT may increase welfare by reducing 
wasted resources.  Second, since trading is speculative by nature, it potentially contributes to 
financial instability when trades are driven by short-term capital gains and not fundamental 
information. Keynes argues that an STT will curtail short-term speculation, and thereby reduce 
wasted resources, market volatility and asset mispricing.  Consistent with Keynes, Tobin (1978) 
proposes a tax on foreign exchange transactions that would make short term currency trading 
unprofitable. He suggests that a transaction tax would "throw some sand in the wheels of 
speculation." 
Consistent with Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1978), Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and 
Summers (1989) argue that an STT targets short-term noise traders whose trades contribute to 
excess market volatility.  Therefore, an STT results in a reduction in volatility.   
Stiglitz (1989) further argues that the impact of an STT on market liquidity would be 
insignificant by examining the inventory risk component of the bid-ask spread.  He contends that 
although an STT will lead to thinner markets, the change in spread will be insignificant since the 
extra   time that market-makers hold securities will not yield a significant change in the inventory 
risk component of the spread. 
In stark contrast to the proponents of an STT, the opponents argue that an STT will have 
an adverse impact on market quality. In particular, Kupiec (1996) develops a model where an 
STT is directly related to excess volatility. Similarly, Amihud and Mendelson (2003) conclude 8 
 
that an STT is directly related to volatility since STTs reduce the amount of informed trading, 
thereby widening the gap between the transaction prices and the security’s fundamental value.    
Schwert and Seguin (1993) argue that an STT would indirectly increase transaction 
costs through the three components of the bid-ask spread: order processing costs, inventory 
risk and information asymmetry.
20 For example, since an STT reduces trading volume, the 
number of trades available for the market-maker to recover his fixed cost declines, thereby 
increasing the order processing component of the spread.
21  The authors further theorize that an 
increase in spreads results in an increase in the cost to traders who take advantage of 
securities mispricing, and thus reduces market efficiency.  That is, when transaction costs 
increase, larger and more persistent mispricing is likely.   With regards to volatility Schwert and 
Seguin suggest that there is no evidence of excess volatility and since the tax is a burden on all 
traders, the reduction in trading will not limit the activity of noise traders alone—it will affect 
liquidity traders and price-stabilizing informed traders as well.  Therefore, the impact of the tax 
on volatility is ambiguous. 
Just as the theoretical literature is divided on the impact of STTs on market quality, so 
too is the empirical literature. Apart from Roll (1989), which performs cross-country regressions, 
the eleven empirical studies examine 28 different STT tax (and quasi-tax) changes in 11 
different countries. We summarize the empirical literature in Table 1 and discuss it below. For 
each paper we list the change in percentage tax (quasi-tax) for each event since there may be a 
relationship between the size of the change and the impact on volatility. We also list for each 
paper the measures examined in the paper as well as the finding for each measure. Statistically 
                                                            
20 The order processing component is part of the fixed cost the market-maker charges for trade execution. 
The inventory risk component is the market-maker’s compensation for holding onto risky assets.  The 
information asymmetry component represents the likelihood that a market-maker is facing an informed 
trader who has superior knowledge of the asset’s fundamental value.   
21 An STT will also increase the order processing component directly due to the cost of collecting the tax. 
Second, because equity market-makers use derivatives to hedge their risky inventory positions, an STT 
on derivatives increases the cost of hedging their positions. The increase in the market-maker’s cost for 
hedging increases the inventory risk part of the bid-ask spread.  Finally, if an STT reduces the amount of 
noise trading, as proponents suggest, then the possibility of the market-maker facing an informed trader 
increases, thereby increasing the information asymmetry element of the bid-ask spread.   9 
 
significant findings are indicated by an asterisk, otherwise the finding is insignificant. Rather 
than discussing each paper separately we will focus on the findings for each measure of market 
quality examined. 
Volatility 
Of the nine papers that empirically examine changes in volatility around changes in 
STTs, only one (Roll (1989)) finds the inverse relationship predicted by Stiglitz (1989) and 
Summers and Summers (1989). That relationship is, however not significant. Two of the papers 
(Baltagi, Li, and Li (2006) and Jones and Seguin (1997)) find a statistically significant direct 
relationship between volatility and the level of an STT which supports the predictions of Kupiec 
(1996) and Amihud and Mendelson (2003). The remaining papers either find an insignificant 
direct relationship (Umlauf (1993) and Hau (2006)) or conclude that they find no relationship.  
Volume  
Each of the five studies that examine the relationship between volume and an STT find 
evidence of an inverse relationship. Baltagi, Li, and Li (2006) find a statistically significant 
relationship while the remaining papers (Hu (1998), Liu (2007) Sahu (2008) and Jarrell (1984)) 
report an insignificant inverse relationship.
22 These papers support the theoretical predictions of 
an inverse relationship argued by Schwert and Seguin (1993). A complementary measure 
related to volume used in the literature is market share. For example, Campbell and Froot 
(1994) point out that in many cases domestic investors can avoid STTs by trading in another 
country. Consistent with Campbell and Froot, Umlauf (1993), finds that an increase in a 
securities transaction tax results in a decline in market share in the domestic country.  Existing 
studies may not be able to capture the true level of volume transferred between exchanges due 
to currency risk concerns as well as the lack of fungibility existing across borders.    
Spreads 
                                                            
22 Jarrell (1984) does not conduct tests of significance. 10 
 
Prior to this study there has been a lack of empirical evidence of the impact of an STT 
on spread.  The literature on the impact of stock transaction taxes on spreads largely relies on 
the indirect effect of trading volume on liquidity.  
Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2009) examine the relationship between spreads and 
STTs in a laboratory setting in the context of different types of traders. They examine three 
scenarios for the impact of an STT on the components of bid-ask spread. If noise traders are 
less active because of the STT, the inventory risk component of the spread may decrease; the 
adverse selection cost may increase; or it may remain unchanged. If noise traders trade less, 
then prices will be less volatile and the inventory risk component of the bid-ask spread will 
decline, thereby increasing liquidity.  However, if noise traders trade less, increasing the 
probability of informed trading, then the adverse selection costs could increase, resulting in a 
increase in spreads.  Finally, given a decline in noise trading from an STT, informed traders may 
trade less aggressively on their information, keeping adverse selection costs unchanged. 
Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2006) use the total price impact as a proxy for spreads and find 
no significant effect on spreads or price impact.  
The empirical literature does not reach a consensus. By empirically examining nine 
changes in the level of an STT in the same market with market share not being clouded by 
fungibility, this paper adds to the empirical literature on STTs. 
 
IV.  Data and Methodology   
We obtain dates for changes in the level of security transaction taxes at the state and 
federal level from the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. As stated earlier, in addition to 
the federal stock transfer tax instituted in 1914, the states of New York, Massachusetts, and 
Pennsylvania all enacted STTs during the last century. As previously shown, the Massachusetts 
and Pennsylvania taxes were minuscule so they are ignored. Since one goal of this paper is to 
examine whether traders move their trading to avoid taxes, we do not examine the nationwide 11 
 
federal tax. We then focus on changes in the New York STT from its imposition in 1905 through 
its elimination in 1981. The dates and tax rates are contained in Appendix A. There are eleven 
tax changes that impact both residents and non-residents. The October 1, 1968 tax change 
placed a cap of $350 on the tax paid for one transaction. The cap impacted trades of over 7,000 
shares for prices above $20 and trades of over 28,000 shares for prices less than $5. Since this 
was limited to larger trades we would not expect a market wide change in market quality and 
thus do not examine that change. 
We use daily closing prices and volume to estimate the impact of an STT on volatility, 
spreads and price impact. Daily closing prices and volume for the NYSE, American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The CRSP 
databases do not contain prices prior to 1925; therefore due to data limitations we are not able 
to examine the imposition of the New York STT in 1905. We then limit our study to the nine 
remaining tax changes that impact both residents and non-residents.  
Consistent with Jones and Seguin (1997), we define sample stocks as all those 
continuously traded on the two New York stock exchanges - the NYSE and AMEX from one 
year before to one year after each tax change. There are four exceptions to this rule due to the 
proximity of confounding events. The March 1932 New York increase occurs just three months 
before the June 1932 doubling of the federal STT. As stated earlier, corporations managed the 
STT paid by their investors by changing their par values. We hypothesize that changing the 
New York STT to a per share basis (June 1933) will have a larger impact on market quality than 
doubling the amount taxed on par value at both the New York (March 1932) and Federal (June 
1932) level. To test this hypothesis we use the twelve months before the March 1932 New York 
event and the eleven months June 1932 through May 1933 as the post period.  For the July 
1966 New York state tax increase, six months pre and post are used to avoid a confounding 
influence related to the January 1966 elimination of the federal security transaction tax. 12 
 
Similarly, fixed commissions (a pseudo transaction tax) were abolished three months prior to the 
August 1975 STT increase. Therefore, the 1975 event uses three months pre and post. Finally, 
the August 1, 1978 tax change coincides with the introduction of the Intermarket Trading 
System. A pilot program of 11 stocks traded on the NYSE and Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
began in April 1978. Between August and November 1978 the program was expanded to 
include all inter-listed stocks on multiple regional exchanges.  The 1978 tax change gives orders 
placed through ITS (and destined for the NYSE) a 100% rebate. To avoid confounding 
influences of the ITS start up period, we define the post period for the 1978 tax change as 
December 1978 through June 1979. 
In their study of the elimination of fixed commissions, Jones and Seguin (1997) employ 
NASDAQ stocks as a control sample. During the period of our study, NASDAQ's headquarters 
was in Washington, DC. Many of the stocks listed on NASDAQ were similarly headquartered 
outside of New York and therefore stock transfers took place outside of New York as well. 
Finally many NASDAQ traders were not residents of New York. For these reasons a large 
portion of the trading occurring on NASDAQ was not subject to the New York STT. Therefore, 
we adopt the methodology of Jones and Seguin and use NASDAQ firms as a control sample.
23 
Since CRSP data are not available for NASDAQ prior to 1972, we can only employ this control 
sample for tax changes from 1975 on.   
The market quality measure that has garnered the most attention in theoretical and 
empirical papers is volatility.  Following Jones and Seguin (1997) we adopt a portfolio approach 
rather than examining individual securities. Jones and Seguin argue that the portfolio approach 
is superior to examining single stocks since most investors hold portfolios and measuring 
portfolios removes measure bias due to microstructure effects such as the bid-ask bounce. The 
portfolios consist of either all the NYSE/AMEX stocks or all of the NASDAQ stocks. Volatility is 
                                                            
23 Consistent with Jones and Seguin (1997) any NASDAQ stock with a market value less than the 
smallest NYSE/AMEX firm is excluded.  13 
 
defined as the standard deviation of continuously compounded daily returns for the period 
before ( pre σ ) and the period after ( post σ ) a change in the level of STT. We then specify the 
change in volatility as post pre σ σσ Δ= − .  For each day t over the estimation period we calculate 
the equally weighted return for portfolio p (NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ), pt R . To estimate σpre and 
σpost we follow Johnson and Kotz (1970) (as well as Jones and Seguin (1997)) and estimate the 




where π is the mathematical constant.
24  
Table 2 reports cross-sectional means of market values, stock prices, and our daily 
return standard deviation measure of volatility based on continuously compounded returns for 
NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for each tax change. For NYSE/AMEX stocks we observe 
that the average price is fairly stable over the entire sample period. We also note that volatility is 
fairly stable around each NYSE/AMEX STT change from 1945 on. For the NASDAQ stocks we 
observe that the firms are smaller than NYSE/AMEX firms and exhibit lower average prices than 
those of the NYSE/AMEX. Note that our sample of NASDAQ stocks has lower average volatility 
than the NYSE/AMEX sample. This is consistent with the findings of Jones and Seguin (1997). 
To obtain an estimate of the change in volatility following a tax change, we regress the 
standard deviation of each portfolio on a dummy variable  IPost,t which takes the value 1 if the 
day is after the tax change, otherwise zero or,  
                                                            
24 Johnson and Kotz (1970) show that if returns are normally distributed, an unbiased estimator of σ  can 




π − =− , where n is the number of 




= .  Under the assumption that the mean of asset returns is zero, 
the mean deviation reduces to pt R .  Johnson and Kotz (1970) note that an unbiased estimator of 
standard deviation is the mean deviation multiplied by bn.  It then follows that when the mean asset return 
is zero and n is large, the standard deviation of portfolio p is /2 pt R π .  14 
 
      01, /2 ptpp P O S T t p t RI πβ β ε =+ +  ,                                                      (1) 
βp0 then represents an estimate of the pre-event volatility and βp1 represents the change in 
volatility from the pre-event. Newey-West standard errors with five lags are reported for the 
volatility change βp1.  More specifically, we estimate: 
  01 , /2
NY NY NY NY
ptpp P O S T t p t RI πβ βε =+ + ,                            
  01 , /2
NASD NASD NASD NASD
ptpp P O S T t p t RI πβ βε =+ +                              (2) 
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The methodology described above does not account for differing volatility levels across 
the two markets. To control for unequal variances we follow Schwert and Seguin (1990) and 
model conditional heteroskedasticity for a portfolio as being linear in the predicted standard 
deviation of some aggregate portfolio factor.
25 We specify the NYSE/AMEX firms as a function 
of the NASDAQ portfolio conditional on volatility. Given that NASDAQ transactions were largely 
not affected by New York State transfer taxes, we use the NASDAQ portfolio as a proxy for the 
single volatility factor.   
Specifically, we first obtain the fitted value of daily NASDAQ portfolio return standard 
deviation by regressing the standard deviation of returns on the size-relevant NASDAQ portfolio 
at time t onto 12 lags of daily returns.  That is,  
                          
            ∑        
          
  
                                                       (3) 
where    
    is the absolute value of returns to the NASDAQ portfolio multiplied by  
2    .  We 
then use the fitted values in the following regression 
                           
                 
              
         ,                              (4) 
                                                            
25 Schwert and Seguin (1990) find that a single-factor model of standard deviations describes the cross 
sectional and time series characteristics of portfolio volatility as well as a GARCH model, and better than 
a linear variance-based specification.  15 
 
where    
  is the standard deviation of a NYSE portfolio p at time t estimated as the absolute 
value of the return to the portfolio multiplied by /2 π ;  , POST t I  is a dummy variable, taking on the 
value 0 for the pre-event period and 1 for the post event time frame;      
    is the estimated 
standard deviation of returns on the size-relevant NASDAQ portfolio at time t, conditional on 12 
lags of daily returns. The parameter estimate γ1 then measures the level of NYSE/AMEX 
volatility relative to NASDAQ volatility.  
To capture the effect of the STT change on volatility, we specify an interaction variable 
between the dummy and the NASDAQ portfolio standard deviation variable,       
         , .  This 
allows for the measurement of changes in volatility of our NYSE/AMEX sample firms as a result 
of a tax change, while using NASDAQ firms to control for conditional heteroskedasticity. 
Therefore, the parameter estimate γ2 measures changes in the proportional level of 
NYSE/AMEX volatility. However, due to lack of data availability, we can only apply this 
methodology to events from 1971 on. 
The next market quality measure we examine is spread width. This measure has not 
been previously examined in the extant literature. However, bid and ask data is not available for 
US stocks prior to the 1990s. Recently Holden (2009) has developed a low frequency proxy for 
effective spread width that Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) show provides good 
estimates of actual effective spread. We employ the Holden low frequency measure which is 
described in Appendix B. 
Two other market quality variables of interest are volume and market share for 
exchanges in and out of New York around each tax change. Traders can switch their trading to 
an exchange outside of New York to avoid the New York STT if that opportunity exists.   
However, for the majority of our sample period, shares were traded in physical form so it was 
necessary for brokers and transfer agents to be close to each other to transfer actually 
securities.  As a result, it was more difficult for investors to avoid the tax.  In addition, while 16 
 
many NYSE stocks were traded on regional exchanges outside of New York, American Stock 
Exchange stocks were not. Therefore, we limit this part of the study to NYSE stocks.  If traders 
do indeed switch to non-NYSE venues to avoid the tax then we should see a reduction in the 
NYSE's market share and volume following tax increases and an increase following tax 
reductions. To obtain the needed data, we hand collect monthly volume figures from the Bank 
and Quotation Record for each regional exchange as well as the NYSE.  Market share is 
estimated as the total stock volume for each exchange in month t divided by the total sum of 
volume on all exchanges.  That is, 















,                             (5) 
where x represents the exchange in month t with n total exchanges at time t. To calculate 
impacts we average market share for each exchange over either the pre or post period. 
  The final market quality measure we examine is price impact. If an STT reduces volume 
then we would expect trades to have larger price impact, ceteris paribus. Again, due to data 
limitations during the period of our study we rely on low-frequency proxies for price impact. We 
rely on the Amihud (2002) price impact measure which has been shown by Goyenko, Holden 
and Trzcinka (2009) to be a good proxy for price impact. Amihud (2002) studies the time series 
relationship between returns and illiquidity and estimates illiquidity as an average of the daily 
ratio of unsigned stock returns to its dollar volume. Specifically, illiquidity is measured as 
          
|  , |
$       , 
                                                6  
 
where ri,t and $Volumei,t  are the stock return and dollar volume for stock i on day t, respectively.  
This ratio can be interpreted as the daily price impact of order flow because it measures 
absolute price change per dollar of daily trading volume. 
In the next section we discuss the results of tests to measure changes in our market 
quality measures around STT changes. 17 
 
 
V.   Results 
The first market quality measure we examine is volatility. Recall that proponents of an 
STT argue that the imposition or increase in the tax will reduce speculation and hence volatility. 
Therefore they predict an inverse relationship between an STT and volatility. However, only one 
(Roll (1989)) of the nine empirical papers cited in Table 1 that examine volatility finds evidence 
of an inverse relationship as predicted by proponents of the tax.
26 All but one of the remaining 
papers finds no statistically significant relationship, while Jones and Seguin (1997) find a 
statistically significant direct relationship between the tax and volatility. We use the methodology 
of Jones and Seguin to examine the relationship between volatility and nine changes in the level 
of the New York State STT between 1932 and 1981.  
The results of our regressions are found in Table 3. Panel A reports the date and nature 
of each change in the first column. The next column lists the percentage point change in the 
STT for a $5 stock. The remaining columns show the parameter estimates for each change for 
stocks listed on the New York and American stock exchanges.  The parameter estimate of 
interest is βp1  which measures the change in volatility following the  change in the STT.   
Examining the parameter estimates in column four reveals that in five instances volatility 
appeared to change in the direction of the tax change (1932, 1933, 1966, 1980, and 1981) while 
the level of volatility appears to move in the opposite direction of the tax change for four of the 
events (1945, 1975, 1978, and 1979). Only four of the nine estimates are statistically significant 
at acceptable levels and there is no consistent pattern among these four estimates. 
It may very well be that the observed changes in volatility are the result of market wide 
changes in volatility unrelated to changes in the STT rate. To test for this we employ NASDAQ 
stocks as a control group. Since NASDAQ was located in Washington DC it was not subject to 
the tax on listed stocks. In addition, brokers and residents of states outside of New York were 
                                                            
26 Only nine of the ten papers examine volatility. Liu (2007) does not. 18 
 
likewise exempt from the New York STT for stocks incorporated outside of New York. NASDAQ 
data are only available starting in 1975.
27 Comparing the NASDAQ parameter estimates in 
column six to their counterparts for NYSE and AMEX stocks reveals that in all five comparisons, 
NASDAQ stock volatility changed in a direction similar to NYSE/AMEX stocks. Further four of 
the five NASDAQ parameter estimates are statistically significant suggesting that there may 
indeed have been market wide changes in volatility unrelated to the change in the STT. We test 
whether the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ parameter estimates are statistically similar using a 
Wald test. The Wald p values are listed in the last column of Panel A in Table 3. The p values 
suggest that the parameter estimates for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ are statistically 
indistinguishable providing further evidence that the observed changes in volatility are related to 
market wide changes and not changes in the STT. Taken together, the results reported in Panel 
A agree with the majority of the empirical papers listed in Table 1. There appears to be no 
statistically significant relationship between the level of an STT and volatility.  
In Panel A we examine the absolute changes in volatility. However, this may not be 
appropriate measure of volatility if volatility varies across the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
portfolios. Therefore, in Panel B we present results for proportional changes in volatility. The 
first two columns in Panel B list the date and event tested and the percent change in the STT for 
a $5 stock. The next three columns list the parameter estimates, followed by the R
2 in the last 
column. The parameter of interest is    which measures the proportional change in 
NYSE/AMEX volatility relative to NASDAQ following a change in the STT. For four (1975, 1979, 
1980, 1981) of the five events examined in Panel B, NYSE/AMEX volatility moves in the same 
direction as the STT change, however, only  one parameter estimate is statistically significant.  
                                                            
27 Prior to 1975, trading occurred when brokers contacted other brokers who were listed as trading a 
stock on the Pink Sheets. Quotes on the Pink Sheets were often stale and therefore closing prices were 
impossible to estimate.  Beginning in 1975, NASDAQ automated the Pink Sheets for a large number of 
stocks and allowed for contemporaneous quote updating. Closing prices were based on the midpoint of 
the closing spread until 1980. At that time, NASDAQ market makers began reporting their trades 
contemporaneously and closing prices could therefore be determined. 19 
 
In particular, for the 1979 event, NYSE/AMEX volatility is on average 93% of NASDAQ volatility 
before the 30% rebate, but falls to 85% (0.927 - 0.076) of NASDAQ volatility after the STT 
decline. Thus, the results reported in Panel B agree with our previous findings, in that there 
appears to be no consistent statistically significant relationship between the level of an STT and 
volatility. 
The next market quality measure we examine is spread width. This measure has not 
been previously examined in the extant literature. Since bid and ask data is not available for US 
stocks prior to the 1990s, we employ the Holden low frequency measure described in Appendix 
B. It has been shown to be a good proxy for effective spread. We first examine univariate 
changes in spread width surrounding our STT events. The pre-event, post-event, and change in 
spread are listed in Panel A of Table 4. Only NYSE and AMEX stocks are included in this table. 
Examining the average change in spread and comparing it to the change in STT reveals that in 
all cases spread width changed in the direction of the STT. In all but one case, the change is 
statistically significant at acceptable levels.  Due to data limitations, we are unable to compute 
the Holden proxy for NASDAQ firms.
28 
The changes in spread reported in Panel A may be the result of changes in other 
variables known to be associated with spread width. Accordingly we perform control regressions 
of the form 
       ,               ,        ,            ,      ,                            7  
 
where Vol is traded volume for stock i on day t, σ is measured by  /2 pt R π , and Dummy 
takes the value 0 pre-event and 1 post-event. The parameter estimates of the control regression 
are found in Panel B of Table 4. Consistent with previous literature the parameter estimate for 
volume is mostly negative and that for volatility positive. The parameter of interest is   .  
Examining the estimates, only in one of the nine cases is the observed sign of the Dummy 
                                                            
28 CRSP does not report NASDAQ volumes until the 1980s.  20 
 
estimate of the opposite sign of the STT change. However, in the parameter estimate is not 
significant. Of the eight remaining cases where the parameter estimate and STT are of the 
same sign, six are statistically significant at acceptable levels. Based on the univariate and 
multivariate evidence in Table 4, we conclude that an STT has a direct relationship with spread 
width. That is, imposing or increasing an STT will be associated with wider spreads. For both 
the univariate and multivariate tests, consistent with our hypothesis, the 1933 event exhibits a 
larger change in spread than the 1932 event, indicating that per share taxes result in larger 
market quality changes than par value tax changes since the latter can be managed by 
corporations through par value changes. 
Given the inverse relationship between spread width and volume documented in 
previous literature, and given that we find spreads to have a significant direct relationship with 
changes in STT levels, we would also expect volume to have an inverse relationship. Of the five 
papers listed in Table 1 that examine volume, all five find an inverse relationship between an 
STT and volume, but only one is statistically significant. Accordingly, we next examine volume. 
We must remember though that the STT changes we examine only impact New York State 
exchanges, corporations, and residents. Therefore we expect the impact of changes in the level 
of the New York STT to mostly impact New York exchanges. We must also remember that in 
some circumstances non-New York investors could avoid the tax by trading on exchanges 
outside of NY. Changes in STTs may induce those that can to switch trading to another 
exchange. Umlauf (1993) documents that the increase in Swedish transaction taxes in 1986 is 
associated with a dramatic shift in trading from Stockholm to London. 
We therefore examine both market share and volume for the NYSE and regional 
exchanges in Table 5. Listed is the average market share and monthly share volume for each 
exchange before and after each New York STT change. During the time period of our study 
(1932-1981) an increasing portion of regional stock exchange volume was in NYSE listed 21 
 
stocks.
29  Therefore, we expect that regional stock exchange market share would increase 
(decrease) when New York State increases (decreases) the level of the STT.  However, 
because the New York State tax was applied as long as part of the transaction took place within 
the state (i.e. if the location of the exchange, contra broker or transfer agent is in New York or if 
the stock seller is domiciled in New York) and most brokers and transfer agents were located in 
New York, it may have been difficult for investors to shift their trading and avoid the STT.  We 
find that for five of the nine STT changes (1933, 1945, 1966, 1975, and 1978) the sign of NYSE 
market share change was opposite that of the STT sign change, and in four cases it was of the 
same sign. Therefore, our results are mixed.
30  
Some investors may not switch to (from) a regional exchange if there is an increase 
(decrease) in the New York STT. Some may just not trade certain stocks. Therefore, we must 
also look at volume since it captures volume switched to other exchanges as well as decisions 
to not trade at all. Examining NYSE volume in the last three columns of Table 5 reveals that, in 
eight of the nine STT changes, volume moved in the opposite direction of the tax change. Six of 
those eight cases are statistically significant at acceptable levels. Therefore we conclude that, 
consistent with previous empirical papers, STTs and volume are inversely related.  
Since trading volume acts as a shock absorber for price impacts, we would also expect 
that changes in STT levels would affect measures of price impact. We examine that possibility 
by considering the Amihud measure. An increase in the Amihud measure indicates a decrease 
in liquidity in that a given volume will have a larger price impact. A direct relationship between 
the Amihud measure and changes in the STT would suggest that STTs harm market quality, 
while an inverse relationship would suggest that it improves it. Table 6 provides univariate 
changes in the Amihud measure surrounding STT level changes. Examining the change in the 
                                                            
29 See Weaver (2008) for a discussion of the changing role of regional stock exchanges in the 20th 
Century. 
30 It is possible that the change in market share is related to other changing factors such as the increased 
use of technology and demographics.  Due to data limitations we are unable to control for these changes.  22 
 
Amihud measure after the STT changed reveals that for seven of the nine STT changes the 
Amihud measure changed in the direction of the tax change and that all seven cases are 




Security transaction taxes have been the subject of debate for decades among 
academics that develop models of the relationship between STTs and market quality, 
empiricists who examine the relationships for existing taxes, and governments seeking to raise 
revenue without harming economic growth. In spite of the length of the debate, no consensus 
has yet been reached. We add to the debate by examining the impact on market quality of nine 
changes to the New York State STT between the first significant change to it in 1932 and its 
repeal in 1981.  
We find that increasing an STT is accompanied by an increase in transaction costs for 
investors, a reduction in volume, and higher price impact for trades. We find no consistent 
relationship that suggests that investors will switch trading to non taxing venues to avoid the tax, 
but do find that corporations will manage par values in the direction of minimizing taxes if they 
are based on par value. Finally, we find no support for the notion that STTs reduce volatility. 
Our findings largely come down on the side of opponents of the tax who suggest that an 
STT will harm market quality. Since spreads have been shown to be directly related to a firm's 
cost of capital, imposing an STT may hinder economic growth by reducing the present value of 
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Changes in the New York State Security Transaction Tax This appendix summarizes 
changes in the New York State Security Transaction Tax from its imposition in 1905 to its elimination 
in 1981. Beginning in 1932 the tax was charged on a per share basis. At various points during the 
reign of the tax, state residents were taxed differently than non-residents. For these reasons we list 
the effective tax for New York State residents (Panel A) and non-residents (Panel B) separately. We 
also list the effective tax per share for stocks of different prices as listed in tax legislation. In both 
Panels,   P is the security price and the last column indicates the general direction of the tax rate. 
 
Panel A: Effective tax rate on per share basis for residents placing orders in New York 
Date  P<$5  $5<P<$10  $10<P<$20  $20<P  Change to State 
STT 
June 1, 1905  $0.02 on $100 par value of stock transferred in New York 
State on round lots.  Began 
March 1, 
1932 
$0.04 on $100 par value of stock transferred in New York 
State on round lots.  Doubled 
June 2, 1933  $0.030  $0.040  Changed to per 
share basis 
July 1, 1945  $0.010  $0.020  $0.030  $0.040  Reduced for stocks 
less than $10 
July 1, 1966  $0.013  $0.025  $0.038  $0.050  25% increase 
Oct 1, 1968  $0.013  $0.025  $0.038  $0.050  Capped at $350 
Aug. 1, 1975  $0.016  $0.031  $0.047  $0.063  25% surcharge 
Aug. 1, 1978  $0.013  $0.025  $0.038  $0.050  25% surcharge 
expires 
Oct 1, 1979  $0.009  $0.002  $0.026  $0.035  After 30% rebate 
Oct. 1, 1980 
  $0.005  $0.010  $0.015  $0.020  After 60% rebate 





Panel B: Effective tax rate on per share basis for non-residents placing orders in NY 
Year  P<$5  $5<P<$10  $10<P<$20  $20<P  Change to State 
STT 
June 1, 1905  $0.020 on $100 par value of stock transferred in New 
York State on round lots.  Imposed 
March 1, 1932  $0.040 on $100 par value of stock transferred in New 
York State on round lots.  Doubled 
June 2, 1933  $0.030  $0.040  Changed to per 
share basis 
July 1, 1945  $0.010  $0.020  $0.030  $0.040  Reduced for stocks 
less than $10 
July 1, 1966  $0.013  $0.025  $0.038  $0.050  25% increase 
Oct 1, 1968  $0.013  $0.025  $0.038  $0.050  Capped $350 
July 1, 1969  $0.012  $0.024  $0.036  $0.048  Paid 95%  
July 1, 1970  $0.011  $0.023  $0.034  $0.045  Paid 90%  
July 1, 1971  $0.010  $0.020  $0.030  $0.040  Paid 80%  
July 1, 1972  $0.008  $0.016  $0.024  $0.033  Paid 65%  
July 1, 1973  $0.006  $0.013  $0.019  $0.025  Paid 50%  
Aug 1, 1975  $0.008  $0.016  $0.023  $0.031  25% surcharge 
April 17, 1978  ($0.000)  ($0.000)  ($0.000)  ($0.000)   (rates for ITS 
orders) 
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The Holden Model for Estimating Spreads from Low Frequency Data 
The Holden (2009) model is an extension of Huang and Stoll (1997) and allows for the spread to 





tt t t t VV S Q α ε −− − =+ +                                            (B.1) 
where  St-1 is the effective spread,  α  is the portion of the half-spread resulting from adverse 
selection  1 t Q −  is the trade indicator that specifies a buy/sell/no trade transaction and  t ε  is the public 
information shock.   
The probability that a closing trade occurs at the bid is 
2
μ
, the probability of a closing trade 
occurring at the  ask is 
2
μ
 and 1 μ − is the probability of a no trade day.
31  Then the trade indicator 
variable  t Q  can be classified into three categories as 
1 Closing trade is a buy (prob =  )
2
0   Closing midpoint (prob= 1 )












      (B.2) 
Let  t M be the unobserved midpoint of the bid-ask spread, which is dependent on the assets 
fundamental value and inventory effects  
, ttt MV ω =+            ( B . 3 )  
where  t ω  is the inventory effect up to day t.  
Substituting equation (B.1) into the first difference of equation (B.3) generates the daily change in 








tt t t t MS Q α εω −− Δ= + + Δ      ( B . 4 )  




tt t t t t PM S Q S η =+ +       ( B . 5 )  
where  () tt S η is the error term with  [() ]0 tt ES η = .  The error term accounts for rounding the 
transaction price to the same price cluster as the spread t S . That is, when  t S = ¼, the price is 
rounded to the closest $¼ ($¼, $½, etc).  





tt t t t t PS Q S Q e α −− Δ= −− +      (B.6) 
where t e  is normally distributed with e  mean and  e σ standard deviation, and  tt t t e ε ηω ≡+ Δ+ Δ
 




tt t H SQ ≡           ( B . 7 )  
Combining (B.1) and (B.2) and solving for the error term in terms of the half spread and the price 
changes yields 
1 (( 1 ) ) ttt t eP H H α − =Δ − − −       ( B . 8 )  
Equation (B.3) is later used when maximizing the likelihood function. 
Holden includes price clustering into his model due to the relationship between observed 
price clusters and the bid-ask spread. Christie and Schultz (1994) find that NASDAQ dealers avoid 
odd eighths to maintain larger spreads.  For example, if transaction prices are on even eighths ($¼, 
$½, $¾, $1) then the bid-ask spread is at least $¼.  While if prices are on odd eighths ($1/8, $3/8, 
$5/8, and $7/8) then the bid-ask spread is likely be $1/8.  Therefore, by avoiding odd eighths, 
dealers can lock in larger spreads.  30 
 
Following Christie and Schultz (1994), the Holden model assumes that the daily effective spread, St 
is the increment of the price cluster on day t.  St is randomly chosen from a set of possible effective 
spreads  , 1,2,..., j sj J =  ordered from smallest to largest, and have corresponding probabilities 




s =  ,  








s = , and 
probability 4 γ  of effective spread  4 $1 s = Given an effective spread, the model assumes that the 




s =  then the 
closing price is equally likely to be on any of the eight possible price increments ($1/8, $2/8, 
$3/8,…,$8/8)].  
Let  1,2,..., t CJ =  represent the observable cluster of special prices that correspond to the effective 
spreads  12 , ,..., J ss s on day t and  1, 2,...,2 t CJ J J = ++  represent the clusters of special midpoints 
for non-trading days that correspond to the effective spreads 12 , ,..., J ss s.  Figure B.1 (Figure 1 from 
Holden 2009)  illustrates how the probabilities of price clusters and the conditional probabilities of 
half spreads are determined.  Price clusters are assigned based on the prices and for each cluster, 
all possible half spreads are determined.  Once price clusters are assigned to each price, the 
probability of each cluster and conditional probability of a half spread given a price cluster is then 
determined.    
Figure B.1 below presents the set up of the Holden (2009) proxy using a $1/8 price grid, which has 












s =  with 
probability 3 γ , and  4 $1 s =  with probability 4 γ .
32   From these points on the price grid, the next part 
of the indicator  t Q  which is the buy/sell/midpoint variable is reached.  From this point the observable 
                                                            
32 All periods studied in this paper are during the period when US exchanges used a $1/8 pricing grid. 31 
 
price/midpoint clusters can be reached.  For example, using Holden (2009) Figure 1 and following 




s =   , the probability of a buy  1 t Q =  occurs with probability
2
μ
.  From 
here there are four possible price clusters 
 
1represents odd $1/8 prices,  2 represents odd $1/4 prices, 








It then follows, from the assumption that closing prices are uniformly distributed, that the probabilities 
of price clusters are ½, ¼, 1/8, 1/8, respectively.  Each price cluster also has a unique set of half 
spreads which are also determined from the price grid and used in the likelihood function.   
To estimate the Holden model a likelihood function is first estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) 
and the parameter estimates are then used to compute the effective spread measures.  
On three consecutive trading days, there are three observable prices  12 (, , ) tt t PP P ++  which correspond 
to a price cluster triplet and a half spread triplet  12 1 2 (, , ) , (, , ) , tt t t t t CC C HH H ++ + + respectively. The half 
spreads are unique to each price cluster and are determined from each cluster.  For example, an 





t S = .  From this spread there are only two possible half spreads  { } 11 $, $ . 16 16 t H ∈−  
12 and  tt PP ++  correspond to half spreads  12 and  tt HH + +  in the same way.   
Next, the likelihood function is constructed and can be estimated using ML for each price triplet as 
      
12
12 1 2 1
12 1 1 2 2
(, , ) 11 221 1
Pr( , , | , , ,..., , , , )
Pr( ) Pr( ) Pr( ) Pr( | ) Pr( | ) Pr( | )
(( ( 1 ) ) ) (( ( 1 ) ) )
tt t
tt t J e
tt t t t t t t t
HH H H ttt t ttt t
PP P e
CC C H CH C H C
nP H P H nP H P H




++ + + + +
∈ ++ +++ +
⋅⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎧⎫
= ⎨⎬ −− − − ⋅ −−− − ⎩⎭ ∑
) ))
    (B.9) 
where  μis the probability of a trading day,  12 1 ˆˆ ˆ , ,..., J γ γγ −  are the spread probabilities except for the 
largest spread, e  is the mean of the error term,  e σ  is the standard deviation of the error term, α  is 
the percentage of the spread attributed to the adverse selection component, n( ) is the normal 32 
 
density with mean e  and standard deviation  e σ  and Pr( ) and Pr( | ) tt t CH C  is the probability of a 
price cluster and conditional probability of a half spread given a price cluster, which are calculated 
based on the price grid (see Figure B.1 below).   
Taking the log of the above likelihood function gives the general likelihood function, which sums all 
the log likelihoods of all price triplets over the time period  
2
12 1 2 1
1
ˆˆ ˆ (Pr( , , | , , ,..., , , , )),
T
tt t J e
t
Ln P P P e μ γγ γ σα
−
++ −
= ∑                 (B.10) 
where T represents the number of days in the time period.  The likelihood function is maximized 




ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ , , ,..., , , 0 and  , , ,..., , 1, where the contraints on   are 

























       ( B . 1 1 )  
where  P is the mean of the closing prices,  ˆ j γ  is the estimated spread probabilities which sum to 
one and  j s  is the possible spread. 33 
 
Figure B.1 
Probabilities Of Price Clusters And The Conditional Probabilities Of Half Spreads 




Summary of Results of Previous Empirical Papers 
 
This table summarizes the results of empirical papers that examine the relationship between 
Security Transaction Taxes (STT) and the quality of equity markets. All but one of the papers 
examines changes in the STT or quasi STT. For each paper we list the country examined, the 
STT change year, and the change. The last Colum lists the market quality measures considered 
and the reported relationship with the STT change. If the relationship is found to be statistically 
significant, it is indicated by an asterisk (
*). Panel A lists those papers that examine STTs while 
Panel B lists those papers that examine quasi STTs. 
 
A. Changes in STT 









1984 0%  1%  Volatility  - Direct 
Price Levels  -  Inverse 
Market Share - Inverse  1986 1%  2% 
Baltagi, 
Li and Li 
(2006) 









1991 0.6%  0.5% 
Price Levels -  Inverse
* 
Volatility - No relationship 
Volume -  Inverse for small stocks. No  
relationship for large stocks. 
 
1992 0.5%  0.4% 
1993  0.4% 0.3% 
Japan 
1977  0.3% 0.45% 
1980  0.45% 0.55% 
Korea 
1978  0.0% 0.5% 
1979  0.5% 0.25% 
1987  0.25% 0.5% 
1990  0.5% 0.2% 
1994  0.2% 0.35% 
Taiwan 
1978  0.15% 0.3% 
1985  0.3% 0.0% 
1986  0.0% 0.3% 
1993  0.3% 0.6% 
Liu 
(2007)  
Japan 1989  0.55% 0.3% 
Price Levels -  Inverse
* 















1963 2%  1% 
Price Levels -  Inverse 
Volatility -  No  relationship 
1974 1%  2% 
1984 2%  1% 
1986 1%  0.5% 
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Table 1 
Summary of Results of Previous Empirical Papers 
(continued) 
 
A. Changes in STT (continued) 





Measures Examined and Finding 
Sahu 
(2008) 
India 2004 0.0 0.15% 
Volume -  Inverse 








1998 0.0  0.3%  Price Levels -  No  relationship 
Volatility - no impact in "normal" economic 
conditions, but direct relationship during bull 
markets 
1999 0.3%  0.6% 
2000 0.6%  0.3% 
B. Changes in Quasi-STT 






Up to 1% 























This table lists summary statistics for NYSE/AMEX stocks following nine changes in the New York 
State Stock Transfer Tax over the period 1932 to 1981 (when the tax was abolished).  NASDAQ 
stocks, when available, are used as a control sample.  Sample stocks are all those continuously 
traded one of the two New York stock exchanges - the NYSE and AMEX one year pre- and one 
year post- each tax change. There are four exceptions to this due to the proximity of confounding 
events. For the March 1932 increase, twelve months pre are used and eleven months post (June 
1932 to May 1933) are used to combine the New York STT doubling with the Federal STT 
doubling and to control for the New York STT change from par values to per share.  For the July 
1966 New York state tax increase, six months pre and post are used to avoid the January 1966 
elimination of the federal security transaction tax. Similarly, fixed commissions were abolished 
three months prior to the August 1975 STT increase. Therefore the 1975 event uses three months 
pre and post. Finally, between April and November regional exchanges join the Intermarket 
Trading system which gives them a rebate on the tax for orders placed through them to New York. 
Accordingly we define the post period as December 1978 through June 1979.  For each event we 
list the percentage change in the security transaction tax for a stock with a market price and par 
value of $5. Descriptive statistics given for both samples include the cross-sectional average price 
per share on the day prior to each event, the average market value (millions) on the day prior to 
each event and the standard deviation of daily equally weighted portfolio returns for the trading 
period prior to each event.   
 

















firms  Price Market 
value   σ  # of 
firms  Price  Market 
value   σ 
March 1, 1932 STT 
doubled   0.02%  236  19.6    102.0    
0.033         
June 2, 1933 
changed to per 
share 
0.58%  238  26.0  126.6  0.060         
1945 reduced for 
stocks less than 
$10 
-0.40%  526  32.7   79.6  0.010         
July 1966: 25% 
increase   0.10%  1,704  28.3  286.8  0.009         
August 1975: 25% 
increase  0.13%  1,912  17.4  326.9  0.010  1,721  11.1  281.4 0.009 
August 1978: 25% 
decrease   -0.16%  1,646  22.2    489.0      0.011  1,540  17.3  401.0 0.008 
October 1979: 30% 
rebate  -0.14%  1,742  22.6  518.4  0.012  1,658  16.7  477.3 0.009 
October 1980: 60% 
rebate   -0.20%  1,802  24.0    583.0  0.010  1,628  18.3  503.0 0.007 
October 1981: 
100% rebate  -0.40%  1,702  19.9  546.3  0.011  1,545  16.7  468.4 0.008 38 
 
 
Table 3  
Portfolio Volatility  
 
This table measures changes in volatility following nine changes in the New York State Stock 
Transfer Tax over the period 1932 to 1981 (when the tax was abolished.) Sample stocks are all 
those continuously traded on the on the two New York stock exchanges - the NYSE and AMEX 
one year pre- and one year post- each tax change. There are four exceptions to this due to the 
proximity of confounding events. For the March 1932 increase, twelve months pre are used and 
eleven months post (June 1932 to May 1933) are used to combine the New York STT doubling 
with the Federal STT doubling and to control for the New York STT change from par values to per 
share.  For the July 1966 New York state tax increase, six months pre and post are used to avoid 
the January 1966 elimination of the federal security transaction tax. Similarly, fixed commissions 
were abolished three months prior to the August 1975 STT increase. Therefore the 1975 event 
uses three months pre and post. Finally, between April and November regional exchanges join 
the Intermarket Trading system which gives them a rebate on the tax for orders placed through 
them to New York. Accordingly we define the post period as December 1978 through June 1979.  
For each event we list the percentage change in the security transaction tax for a stock with a 
market price of $5. 
We define volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns for the period before ( pre σ ) and the 
period after ( post σ ) and specify the change in volatility as post pre σ σσ Δ =− .  The standard 
deviation of portfolio p is defined as  /2 pt R π , where  pt R  is the daily equally weighted portfolio 
and π is the mathematical constant 3.14.  In Panel A we regress the standard deviation of each 
portfolio on a dummy variable which takes the value 0 pre-event and 1 post-event, yields changes 
in volatility.  We thus use the following time-series regression to estimate volatility pre- and post-
event 
01, /2 pt p p POST t pt RI π ββ ε = ++ , 
where  pt R  is the daily equally weighted portfolio and   , POST t I  is a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 for the post-event period and 0 for the time period prior to the event.  Newey-West 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below each parameter. For tax changes starting in 
1975 NASDAQ stocks are used as a control for market wide changes in volatility. The last 
column in Panel A provides results of a Wald test for the equivalency of     between the two 
samples. 
Panel B report the results of the following time-series regression analysis of NYSE/AMEX portfolio 
volatility proportional to NASDAQ volatility:  
   
                 
              
         ,          , 
where    
  is the standard deviation of a NYSE portfolio p at time t estimated as the absolute 
value of the return to the portfolio multiplied by /2 π ;  , POST t I  is a dummy variable, taking on the 
value 0 for the pre-event period and 1 for the post even time frame;      
    is the estimated 
standard deviation of returns on the size-relevant NASDAQ portfolio at time t.  That is, 
     ∑        
          
  
                                                        
where    
    is the daily portfolio return standard deviation of the NASDAQ sample regressed on 
its 12 lags. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Portfolio Volatility  
(continued) 
 
Panel A. Portfolio Volatility Pre- and Post- Event 





















Wald test p-value 
Ho:   
          




0.02%  0.033  0.006 
(1.98*)       
June 2, 1933 
changed to 
per share 
0.58%  0.060  0.009 





-0.40%  0.010  0.002 




0.10%  0.009  0.001 




0.13%  0.010  -0.003 
(-3.03***)  0.009  -0.002 




-0.16%  0.011  0.002 
(1.49)  0.008  0.002 




-0.14%  0.012  0.002 
(1.40)  0.009  0.002 




-0.20%  0.010  -0.001 
(-1.29)  0.007  -0.001 




-0.40%  0.011  -0.001 
(1.21)  0.008  -0.001 
(1.93*)  0.85 





Portfolio Volatility  
(continued) 
 




% Change in 
STT 
 






0.13%  0.0050 
(0.002) 






















0.0012    
(0.004) 
0.927      
(0.077) 








0.0021    
(0.003) 
1.013      
(0.086) 








0.0013     
(0.004) 






***, **,* Denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and the 0.10 level respectively.
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Table 4  
Spread Width 
This table measures changes in spread width following nine changes in the New York State 
Stock Transfer Tax over the period 1932 to 1981 (when the tax was abolished.) Sample stocks 
are all those continuously traded on the on the two New York stock exchanges - the NYSE and 
AMEX one year pre- and one year post- each tax change. There are four exceptions to this due 
to the proximity of confounding events. For the March 1932 increase, twelve months pre are 
used and eleven months post (June 1932 to May 1933) are used to combine the New York STT 
doubling with the Federal STT doubling and to control for the New York STT change from par 
values to per share.  For the July 1966 New York state tax increase, six months pre and post 
are used to avoid the January 1966 elimination of the federal security transaction tax. Similarly, 
fixed commissions were abolished three months prior to the August 1975 STT increase. 
Therefore the 1975 event uses three months pre and post. Finally, between April and November 
regional exchanges join the Intermarket Trading system which gives them a rebate on the tax 
for orders placed through them to New York. Accordingly we define the post period as 
December 1978 through June 1979.  For each event we list the percentage change in the 
security transaction tax for a stock with a market price of $5.  
We define spread as the low frequency measure described in Appendix B and here referred to 
as Holden. Panel A lists the results of univariate tests for changes in spread, while Panel B lists 
the results of the control regression  
       ,               ,        ,            ,      ,  
where Vol is traded volume for stock i on day t, σ is the standard deviation of daily returns, and 
Dummy takes the value 0 pre-event and 1 post event. The parameter estimate is followed by 







Spreadpre  Spreadpost  ΔSpread t 
March 1, 1932 STT 
doubled  0.02%  1.63  3.01  1.38  4.9*** 
June 2, 1933 
changed to per 
share 
0.58% 1.75  3.48  1.73  6.2*** 
1945 reduced for 
stocks less than 
$10 
-0.40% 1.16  0.85  -0.31 -2.30** 
July 1966: 25% 
increase   0.10% 1.19  1.49  0.3  2.00** 
August 1975: 25% 
increase  0.13% 2.20  2.31  0.1  1.70* 
August 1978: 25% 
decrease   -0.16% 1.49  1.42  -0.07 -2.50*** 
October 1979: 30% 
rebate  -0.14% 1.29  1.26  -0.03 -0.17 
October 1980: 60% 
rebate   -0.20% 1.26  1.09  -0.16 -2.50*** 
October 1981: 







Panel B. Control Regressions 
Event  % Change 





0.02%  5.2    















9.8      
4.0*** 
0.61 
















0.10%  2.2      
16.8*** 




0.25      








15.4      
1.6* 
0.28 








9.8         
2.5*** 
-0.44 




-0.14%  2.3          
28.9*** 
-5E-6       
-2.4*** 
4.2       
2.1** 
0.09       




-0.20%  2.3          
28.4*** 
7E-6       
2.3** 
2.5         
1.6 
-0.07 








2.7         
1.8 
-0.06 







Market Share and Volume 
 
This table measures changes in market share and volume for US stock markets following nine 
changes in the New York State Stock Transfer Tax over the period 1932 to 1981 (when the tax 
was abolished.) Volume is defined as the average monthly volume over the period. Market share 



















Exchanges examined are the NYSE and the regional exchanges in existence at the time of the 
STT change. Data are averaged one year pre- and one year post- each tax change. There are 
four exceptions to this due to the proximity of confounding events. For the March 1932 increase, 
twelve months pre are used and eleven months post (June 1932 to May 1933) are used to 
combine the New York STT doubling with the Federal STT doubling and to control for the New 
York STT change from par values to per share.  For the July 1966 New York state tax increase, 
six months pre and post are used to avoid the January 1966 elimination of the federal security 
transaction tax. Similarly, fixed commissions were abolished three months prior to the August 
1975 STT increase. Therefore the 1975 event uses three months pre and post. Finally, between 
April and November regional exchanges join the Intermarket Trading system which gives them a 
rebate on the tax for orders placed through them to New York. Accordingly we define the post 
period as December 1978 through June 1979.  For each event we list the percentage change in 
the security transaction tax for a stock with a market price of $5.  Listed are the pre and post 
event market share and volume per exchange as well as the t-statistic for the post-pre difference. 
 




Market Share and Volume 
(continued) 




event   t-stat  Pre-event   Post-event   t-stat 
Panel A - March 1, 1932 STT doubled 0.02% increase in STT  
NYSE  88.5% 92.2% 3.2** 44,684,316  57,546,326  1.6 
Chicago  4.9% 2.2%  -6.6*** 2,500,417 952,625 -4.4*** 
Philly  1.6% 1.2%  -1.83 811,830 508,993  -2.4** 
L.A.  0.8% 0.5%  -2.56** 399,172 215,719  -3.05*** 
Boston  1.4% 1.5% 0.5 673,552 623,022  -0.40 
Baltimore  0.1% 0.1%  -0.38 40,580 33,528  -0.83 
Pittsburgh  0.3% 0.4% 1.35 128,954 140,868  0.3 
Cleveland  0.1% 0.1% 0.3 39,981 32,532  -1.20 
San Fran.  1.8% 1.3%  -1.67 879,002 551.673  -2.22** 
Detroit  0.6% 0.5%  -1.16 299,416 209,207  -1.70 
 Panel B - June 2, 1933 changed to per share 0.58% increase in STT 
NYSE  92.6% 89.5% -2.3** 53,527,339 36,310,664  -1.77 
Chicago  1.9% 2.5% 1.1 833,667 1,193,333  1.54 
Philly  1.2% 2.8% 1.29 474,950 1,560,784  1.41 
L.A.  0.5% 0.5%  -0.31 201,480 298,840  1.98* 
Boston  1.4% 1.3%  -0.40 559,110 556,060  -0.2 
Baltimore  0.1% 0.1%  -1.25 34,673 77,721  2.02* 
Pittsburgh  0.3% 0.5% 1.28 126,294 219,166  2.1* 
Cleveland  0.9% 0.2%  -2.34** 33,594 94,990  3.51*** 
San Fran.  1.2% 1.9% 1.64 493,948 929,328  2.97*** 




Market Share and Volume 
(continued) 




event   t-stat  Pre-event  Post-event   t-stat 
Panel C – 1945 reduced for stocks less than $10 0.40% decrease for a $5 stock 
NYSE  89.9% 91.7%  6.85*** 31,357,139 39,191,840 15.60*** 
Chicago  2.4% 2.2%  -1.65 833,666 935,333  1.90 
Philly  1.3% 0.9%  -4.06*** 479,070 391,742  -2.88** 
L.A.  1.5% 1.3%  -1.83 530,851 568,162  0.90 
Boston  1.5% 1.0%  -5.6*** 530,478 425,707  -3.33*** 
Baltimore  0.1% 0.1% 1.12 24,778 36,422  7.80*** 
Pittsburgh  0.2% 0.2%  -6.8*** 84,681 77,843  -0.04 
Cleveland  0.1% 0.1% 1.75 46,095 44,436  -0.38 
San Fran.  1.6% 1.4% 1.64 569,306 588,901  1.07 
Detroit  1.2% 1.0%  -2.47** 425,291 451,383  1.27 
Panel D – July 1966: 25% increase in STT 0.10% increase for a $5 stock 
NYSE  90.2% 88.8% -3.50***  173,174,234 143,574,934 -1.97* 
Midwest  3.9% 4.1%  0.97  7,533,833 6,705,833 -1.00 
Philly  1.2% 1.6%  3.51***  2,223,535 2,529,249 2.08* 
Pacific  3.9% 4.6%  2.32**  7,508,775 7,313,173 -0.44 
Boston  0.6% 0.7%  2.47**  1,091,162 1,137,909 0.76 
Pittsburgh  0.1% 0.1%  -0.92  110,783 85,183 -1.58 
Detroit  0.2% 0.2%  0.69  338,685 299,694 -0.78 
Panel E – August 1975: 25% increase in STT 0.13% increase for a $5 stock
NYSE  89.0% 87.9%  -8.95***  448,721,396 307,361,199 -4.33*** 
Midwest  4.4% 4.8%  3.32**  22,025,000 16,655,000 -4.33*** 
Philly  1.7% 2.0%  3.82***  8,613,179 6,831,777 -2.05* 
Pacific  4.0% 4.4%  2.86**  20,017,213 15,522,371 -1.75 
Boston  1.0% 1.0% -0.65  4,959,876 3,333,667 -3.65*** 
Panel F – August 1978: 25% decrease in STT 0.16% decrease for a $5 stock 
NYSE  88.4% 89.1%  1.54 492,256,231 596,529,544 1.98* 
Midwest  4.8% 3.9% -5.34*** 26,265,233 28,028,860  1.0 
Philly  2.2% 2.6%  1.84 12,515,964 18,835,620  5.77*** 
Pacific  3.9% 3.7% -1.17 22,498,255 27,350,599  2.27** 




Market Share and Volume 
(continued) 




event   t-stat  Pre-event  Post-event   t-stat 
Panel G – October 1979: 30% rebate a 0.14% decrease for a $5 stock 
NYSE  89.0% 88.5%  -2.00* 651,084,936 877,307,085 4.7*** 
Midwest  3.9% 4.4%  2.99** 28,811,167 43,749,917 6.8*** 
Philly  2.6% 2.9%  1.93* 19,110,916 28,063,150 6.7*** 
Pacific  3.8% 3.6% -1.25  27,603,845 35,440,801 3.1** 
Boston  0.7% 0.7% -0.81  5,070,833 6,652,500 3.35*** 
Panel H – October 1980: 60% rebate a 0.20% decrease for a $5 stock 
NYSE  88.5% 88.2% -1.07  877,307,085 996,396,401 1.8 
Midwest  4.4% 4.9% 2.79**  43,749,917 55,343,917 3.4*** 
Philly  2.9% 2.8%  -0.31  28,063,150 31,858,280 3.6*** 
Pacific  3.6% 3.4%  -1.50  35,440,801 38,225,695 1.02 
Boston  0.7% 0.6%  -1.46  6,652,500 7,192,333 0.92 
Panel I – October 1981: 100% rebate a 0.40% decrease for a $5 stock 
NYSE  88.2% 87.4%  -4.14*** 996,396,401 1,149,472,970 2.06* 
Midwest  4.9% 5.7%  6.04*** 55,343,917 75,550,417 4.24*** 
Philly  2.8% 2.8%  0.11  31,858,280 37,151,226 2.67** 
Pacific  3.4% 3.5%  0.96  38,225,695 46,700,845 2.2 
Boston  0.6% 0.6% -3.41*** 7,192,333 7,445,000 0.5 
 







Amihud Illiquidity Measure 
This table measures changes the Amihud illiquidity measure following nine changes in the New 
York State Stock Transfer Tax over the period 1932 to 1981 (when the tax was abolished.) 
Sample stocks are all those continuously traded on the on the two New York stock exchanges - 
the NYSE and AMEX one year pre- and one year post- each tax change. There are four 
exceptions to this due to the proximity of confounding events. For the March 1932 increase, 
twelve months pre are used and eleven months post (June 1932 to May 1933) are used to 
combine the New York STT doubling with the Federal STT doubling and to control for the New 
York STT change from par values to per share.  For the July 1966 New York state tax increase, 
six months pre and post are used to avoid the January 1966 elimination of the federal security 
transaction tax. Similarly, fixed commissions were abolished three months prior to the August 
1975 STT increase. Therefore the 1975 event uses three months pre and post. Finally, between 
April and November regional exchanges join the Intermarket Trading system which gives them a 
rebate on the tax for orders placed through them to New York. Accordingly we define the post 
period as December 1978 through June 1979.  For each event we list the percentage change in 
the security transaction tax for a stock with a market price of $5. The illiquidity measure, 
Amihud, is defined as 
          
|  , |
$       , 
 
 
Where rit and $Volumei,t  are the stock return and dollar volume for stock i on day t, respectively. 






Amihudpre  Amihudpost  ΔAmihud t 
March 1, 1932 STT 
doubled)  0.02%  2.6E-10 4.9E-10 2.3E-10 7.9*** 
June 2, 1933 
changed to per 
share 
0.58%  2.8E-10 4.7E-10 1.9E-10 6.97***
1945 reduced for 
stocks less than 
$10 
-0.40%  4.1E-10 4.4E-10 3.5E-9 1.18 
July 1966: 25% 
increase   0.10%  1.0E-10 1.4E-10 4.2E-9 3.18***
August 1975: 25% 
increase  0.13%  1.0E-10 7.4E-9 -2.7E-9  -2.22** 
August 1978: 25% 
decrease   -0.16%  3.3E-11 2.6E-10  -7.3E-10  -1.99** 
October 1979: 30% 
rebate  -0.14%  3.2E-11 2.7E-11  -4.4E-10  -1.74* 
October 1980: 60% 
rebate   -0.20%  2.7E-11 2.0E-11  -7.2E-10  -3.75***
October 1981: 
100% rebate  -0.40%  2.1E-11 1.6E-11  -4.3E-10  -3.25***
 
  ***, **,* Denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and the 0.10 level respectively. 
 